Introduction
The ability for a node to specify a unicast forwarding path, other than the normal shortest path, that a particular packet will traverse, benefits a number of network functions, for example: Previdi, et Source-based routing mechanisms have previously been specified for network protocols, but have not seen widespread adoption other than in MPLS traffic engineering.
These network functions may require greater flexibility and per packet source imposed routing than can be achieved through the use of the previously defined methods. In the context of this document, the term 'source' means 'the point at which the explicit route is imposed' and therefore it is not limited to the originator of the packet (i.e.: the node imposing the explicit route may be the ingress node of an operator's network). Throughout this document we refer to this definition of 'source'.
In this context, Source Packet Routing in Networking (SPRING) architecture is being defined in order to address the use cases and requirements described in this document.
The SPRING architecture MUST allow incremental and selective deployment without any requirement of flag day or massive upgrade of all network elements.
The SPRING architecture MUST allow to put policy state in the packet header and not in the intermediate nodes along the path. Hence, the policy is instantiated in the packet header and does not requires any policy state in midpoints and tail-ends.
The SPRING architecture objective is not to replace existing source routing and traffic engineering mechanisms but rather complement them and address use cases where removal of signaling and path state in the core is a requirement.
Multicast use-cases and requirements are out of scope of this document. This section illustrates an example use-case. In order to cope with the reality of current deployments, the SPRING architecture MUST allow PE to PE forwarding according to the IGP Some deployments have a limited use of TE such as addressing specific application or customer requirements or address specific bandwidth limitation in the network (tactical TE). In this situation, there is need to reduce as much of possible the cost (such as the number of signaling protocols and the number of nodes requiring specific configurations/features. Some other deployments have a very high scale use of TE, such as fine tuning flows at the application level. In this situation, there is a need for a very high scalability, in particular on mid-points.
The source-based routing model allows traffic engineering to be implemented without the need of a signaling component. o Limiting (scalable, preferably zero) per-service state and signaling on midpoint and tail-end routers.
o ECMP-awareness o node resiliency property (i.e.: the traffic-engineering policy is not anchored to a specific core node whose failure could impact the service.
In most cases, Traffic Engineering makes use of the "loose" route option where most of the explicit paths can be expressed through a small number of hops. However, there are use cases where the "strict" option may be used and, in such case, each individual hop in the explicit path is specified. This may incur into a long list of hops that is instantiated into a MPLS label stack (in the MPLS dataplane) or list of IPv6 addresses (in the IPv6 dataplane).
It is obvious that in case of long strict source routing paths, the deployment is possible if the head-end of the explicit path supports the instantiation of long explicit paths.
Alternatively, a controller could decompose the end-to-end path into a set of sub-paths such as each of these sub-paths is supported by its respective head-end and advertised with a single identifier. Hence, the concatenation (or stitching) of the sub-paths identifiers gives a compression scheme allowing an end-to-end path to be expressed in a smaller number of hops. Each aggregation region k is connected to the core by two C routers C1k and C2k where k refers to the region.
C1k is part of plane 1 and aggregation region k C2k is part of plane 2 and aggregation region k C1k has a link to C2j iff k = j.
The core nodes of a given region are directly connected. Inter-region links only connect core nodes of the same plane.
{C1k has a link to C1j} iff {C2k has a link to C2j}.
The distribution of these links depends on the topological properties of the core of the AS. The design rule presented above specifies that these links appear in both core planes.
We assume a common design rule found in such deployments: the interplane link costs (Cik-Cjk where i != j) are set such that the route to an edge destination from a given plane stays within the plane unless the plane is partitioned. o Node resiliency property: the traffic-engineering policy is not anchored to a specific core node whose failure could impact the service.
3.3.1.1.2. Egress Peering Traffic Engineering Let us assume, in the network depicted in Figure 3 , that:
C in AS1 learns about destination Z of AS 4 via two BGP paths (AS2, AS4) and (AS3, AS4).
C may or may not be configured so to enforce next-hop-self behavior before propagating the paths within AS1.
C may propagate all the paths to Z within AS1 (BGP add-paths, [I-D.ietf-idr-add-paths]).
C may install in its FIB only the route via AS2, or only the route via AS3, or both.
In that context, the SPRING architecture MUST allow the operator of AS1 to apply a traffic-engineering policy such as the following one, regardless the configured behavior of next-hop-self:
Steer 60% of the Z-destined traffic received at A via AS2 and 40% via AS3.
Steer 80% of the Z-destined traffic received at B via AS2 and 20% via AS3.
The SPRING architecture MUST allow an ingress node (i.e., an explicit route source node) to select the exit point of a packet as any In the above example, the operator requires PE1 to load-balance its PE2-destined traffic between the ABCDE and ABFE equal-cost paths in a controlled way where the operator MUST be allowed to distribute traffic unevenly between paths (Weighted Equal Cost Multiplath, WECMP).
Traffic Engineering with Bandwidth Admission Control
The implementation of bandwidth admission control within a network (and its possible routing consequence which consists in routing along explicit paths where the bandwidth is available) requires a capacity planning process.
The spreading of load among ECMP paths is a key attribute of the capacity planning processes applied to packet-based networks.
Capacity Planning Process
Capacity Planning anticipates the routing of the traffic matrix onto the network topology, for a set of expected traffic and topology variations. The heart of the process consists in simulating the placement of the traffic along ECMP-aware shortest-paths and accounting for the resulting bandwidth usage.
The bandwidth accounting of a demand along its shortest-path is a basic capability of any planning tool or PCE server. For example, in the network topology described below, and assuming a default IGP metric of 1 and IGP metric of 2 for link GF, a 1600Mbps A-to-Z flow is accounted as consuming 1600Mbps on links AB and FZ, 800Mbps on links BC, BG and GF, and 400Mbps on links CD, DF, CE and EF. This is illustrated in the below network diagram which consists of a subset of a network where already 5 ECMP paths are observed from A to M. When the capacity planning process detects that a traffic growth scenario and topology variation would lead to congestion, a capacity increase is triggered and if it cannot be deployed in due time, a traffic engineering solution is activated within the network.
A basic traffic engineering objective consists of finding the smallest set of demands that need to be routed off their shortest path to eliminate the congestion, then to compute an explicit path for each of them and instantiating these traffic-engineered policies in the network. The SPRING architecture MUST offer a simple support for ECMP-based shortest path placement as well as for explicit path policy without incurring additional signaling in the domain. This includes:
o the ability to steer a packet across a set of ECMP paths o the ability to diverge from a set of ECMP shortest paths to one or more paths not in the set of shortest paths 3.3.1.
SDN Use Case
The SDN use-case lies in the SDN controller, (e.g.: Stateful PCE as described in [I-D.ietf-pce-stateful-pce].
The SDN controller is responsible to control the evolution of the traffic matrix and topology. It accepts or denies the addition of new traffic into the network. It decides how to route the accepted traffic. It monitors the topology and upon topological change, determines the minimum traffic that should be rerouted on an alternate path to alleviate a bandwidth congestion issue.
The algorithms supporting this behavior are a local matter of the SDN controller and are outside the scope of this document.
The means of collecting traffic and topology information are the same as what would be used with other SDN-based traffic-engineering solutions.
The means of instantiating policy information at a trafficengineering head-end are the same as what would be used with other SDN-based traffic-engineering solutions.
In the context of Centralized-Based Optimization and the SDN usecase, here are the functionalities that the SPRING architecture MUST deliver:
Explicit routing capability with or without ECMP-awareness.
No signaling hop-by-hop through the network.
Policy state is only maintained at the policy head-end. No policy state is maintained at mid-points and tail-ends.
Automated guaranteed FRR for any topology. 
Security Considerations
SPRING reuses the concept of source routing by encoding the path in the packet. As with other similar source routing architecture, an attacker may manipulate traffic path by modifying the packet header. By manipulating traffic path, an attacker may be able to cause outages on any part of the network.
SPRING adds some meta-data on the packet, with the list of forwarding path elements that the packet must traverse. Depending on the data plane, this list may shrink as the packet traverse the network, by only keeping the next elements and forgetting the past ones.
SPRING architecture MUST provide clear trust domain boundaries, so that source routing information is only usable within the trusted domain and never exposed to the outside world.
From a network protection standpoint, there is an assumed trust model such that any node imposing an explicit route on a packet is assumed to be allowed to do so. This is a significant change compared to plain IP offering shortest path routing but not fundamentally different compared to existing techniques providing explicit routing capability. It is expected that, by default, the explicit routing information is not leaked through the boundaries of the administered domain.
Therefore, the dataplane MUST NOT expose any source routing information when a packet leaves the trusted domain. Special care will be required for the existing dataplanes like MPLS, especially for the inter-provider scenario where a third-party provider may push MPLS labels corresponding to a SPRING header anywhere in the stack. The architecture document MUST analyze the exact security considerations of such scenario.
Filtering routing information is typically performed in the control plane, but an additional filtering in the forwarding plane is also required. In SPRING, as there is no control plane (related to source routed paths) between the source and the mid points, filtering in the If all MPLS labels are filtered at domain boundaries, then SPRING does not introduce any change. If only a subset of labels are filtered, then SPRING introduces a change since the border router is expected to determine which information (e.g.: labels) are filtered while the border router is not the originator of these label advertisements.
As the SPRING architecture must be based on clear trust domain, mechanisms allowing the authentication and validation of the source routing information must be evaluated by the SPRING architecture in order to prevent any form of attack or unwanted source routing information manipulation.
Dataplane security considerations MUST be addressed in each SPRING dataplane related document (i.e.: MPLS and IPv6).
The IPv6 data plane proposes the use of a cryptographic signature of the source routed path which would ease this configuration. This is indeed more needed for the IPv6 data plane which is end to end in nature, compared to the MPLS data plane which is typically restricted to a controlled and trusted zone.
In the forwarding plane, data plane extension documents MUST address the security implications of the required change.
In term of privacy, SPRING does not propose change in term of encryption. Each dataplane, may or may not provide existing or future encryption capability.
In order to build the source routing information in the packet, a node in SPRING architecture will require learning information from a control layer. As this control layer will be in charge of programming forwarding instructions, an attacker taking over this component may also manipulate the traffic path. Any control protocol used in the SPRING architecture SHOULD provide security mechanisms or design to protect against such control layer attacker. Control plane
